Unlike emotions, existential feelings are not directed towards an object or specific situation, but are the affective background through which experience as a whole is structured. Furthermore, existential feelings are bodily feelings. In that vein, this paper aims to present the theory of existential feelings developed by Matthew Ratcliffe in Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality (2008) and its link to the concept of bodily doubt developed by Havi Carel in Phenomenology of illness (2016) in order (...) to exhibit the importance of bodily feelings in understanding the experience of illness. This paper is divided into three sections: 1) Characterization of the nature of emotions and feelings; 2) Characterization of existential feelings based on the phenomenology of tactile experience, as well as the distinction between existential feeling, emotion and mood; 3) An analysis of the alteration of existential feelings by bodily doubt. (shrink)

One of the main challenges faced by realists in political philosophy is that of offering an account of authority that is genuinely normative and yet does not consist of a moralistic application of general, abstract ethical principles to the practice of politics. Political moralists typically start by devising a conception of justice based on their pre-political moral commitments; authority would then be legitimate only if political power is exercised in accordance with justice. As an alternative to that dominant approach I (...) put forward the idea that upturning the relationship between justice and legitimacy affords a normative notion of authority that does not depend on a pre-political account of morality, and thus avoids some serious problems faced by mainstream theories of justice. I then argue that the appropriate purpose of justice is simply to specify the implementation of an independently grounded conception of legitimacy, which in turn rests on a context- and practice-sensitive understanding of the purpose of political power. (shrink)

The received view says that possibility is the dual of necessity: a proposition is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc.) possible iff it is not the case that its negation is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc., respectively) necessary. This reading is usually taken for granted by modal logicians and indeed seems plausible when dealing with logical or metaphysical possibility. But what about epistemic possibility? We argue that the dual definition of epistemic possibility in terms of epistemic necessity generates tension when reasoning about non-idealized (...) agents and is a problem of concern for most hyperintensional epistemic logics that alleviate the problem of logical omniscience. The tension is particularly evident when knowledge is taken as a primitive to define other epistemic concepts, such as justification and belief, as done in the knowledge-first tradition. We propose a non-dual interpretation of epistemic possibility, employing a hyperintensionality filter similar to the one that makes the corresponding epistemic necessity operator hyperintensional. We employ the proposed semantics to model Stalnaker's belief as epistemic possibility of knowledge and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a hyperintensional version of his bimodal logic of knowledge and belief. (shrink)

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate (...) normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements. (shrink)

In recent years, a new generation of activists has reinvigorated debate over the public commemorative landscape. While this debate is in no way limited to statues, it frequently crystallizes around public representations of historical figures who expressed support for the oppression of certain groups or contributed to their past or present oppression. In this paper, I consider what should be done about such representations. A number of philosophers have articulated arguments for modifying or removing public monuments. Joanna Burch-Brown (2017) grounds (...) her argument for removal in what I call the “honorific” function of such representations—the ways in which they express and tend to cultivate admiration for their subjects. In the first two sections of the paper, I develop a novel argument for modifying these representations based on this insight. I argue that leaving such representations unmodified in the public space tends to undermine the dignity of members of oppressed groups as well as their assurance that society and government are committed to their rights and constitutional entitlements. In the paper’s third section, I develop a “balancing test” for determining whether the relevant moral and pragmatic considerations favor making a particular representation inaccessible to the public, or recontextualizing it for public consumption. Unlike some of the existing philosophical treatments of honorific representations that focus on particular monuments, this balancing test is designed for general application to any honorific representation that satisfies the presumptive case for modification. To conclude, I offer some reasons why weak forms of recontextualization that do not involve altering institutional context may often be an insufficient remedy for the problems I describe. (shrink)

Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller’s reply to my article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral norm N in virtue of having an unfair disposition to blame others, but not themselves, for violations of N. This view raises two key questions. First, are there instances of hypocritical blame that do not involve an unfair differential blaming disposition? Second, if (...) the answer to the first question is Yes, do hypocritical blamers of this kind lack the right to blame? In this paper, I argue that the answer to the first question is Yes. Given this, Fritz and Miller’s account faces serious problems regardless of whether the answer to the second question is Yes or No. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

On some views, we can be sure that parties to a dispute over the logic of ‘exists’ are not talking past each other if they can characterise ‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying a certain set of rules of inference. Otherwise, we ought to be suspicious about the reality of their disagreement. This is what we call a proof- theoretic argument. Pace some critics, who have tried to use proof-theoretic arguments to cast doubts about the (...) reality of disagreements about the logic of ‘exists’, we argue that proof-theoretic arguments can be deployed to establish the reality of several such disagreements. Along the way, we will also utilise this technique to establish similar results about some disagreements over the logic of identity. (shrink)

Rosenkranz (2021) devised two bimodal epistemic logics: an idealized one and a realistic one. The former is shown to be sound with respect to a class of neighborhood frames called i-frames. Rosenkranz designed a specific i-frame able to invalidate a series of undesired formulas, proving that these are not theorems of the idealized logic. Nonetheless, an unwanted formula and an unwanted rule of inference are not invalidated. Invalidating the former guarantees the distinction between the two modal operators characteristic of the (...) logic, while invalidating the latter is crucial in order to deal with the problem of logical omniscience. In this paper, I present an i-frame able to invalidate all the undesired formulas already invalidated by Rosenkranz, together with the missing formula and rule of inference. (shrink)

This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai. According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation (elenchos) of a thesis and the resolution (lysis) of an argument. These two terms are (...) employed fairly consistently by Aristotle in the treatises as well. Since an aporia requires not merely conflicting theses, but conflicting arguments for those theses, I contend that the ideal way out of aporiai involves a critical analysis of those arguments, akin to that involved in the dialectical resolution. A relevant implication of this reading is that it expands the critical use of dialectic for philosophy, and points to the specific philosophical utility of the Sophistical Refutations. (shrink)

In the last two decades Anglophone political theory witnessed a renewed interest in social-scientific empirical findings—partly as a reaction against normative theorizing centred on the formulation of abstract, intuition-driven moral principles. This brief paper begins by showing how this turn has taken two distinct forms: (i) a non-ideal theoretical orientation, which seeks to balance the emphasis on moral principles with feasibility and urgency considerations, and (ii) a fact-centric orientation, which seeks to ground normative conclusions in empirical results. The core of (...) the paper then compares and contrast three variants of fact-centric political theory: normative behaviourism, grounded normative theory, and radical realism. The upshot: normative behaviourism achieves focus on observable behaviour at the cost of status quo bias, grounded normative theory achieves radicalism at the cost of endorsing an activist orientation to theorising, and radical realism combines a non-activist orientation with the potential for far-reaching critique of the status quo. (shrink)

Farmers’ markets (FMs) represent a crucial player in urban food systems, being the interconnection of local agricultural production and consumption, and serving as spaces for both economic exchange and community building. Despite their transformative potential, there is a scarcity of research that comprehensively investigates the dynamics of FMs network structure and the influence of the actors shaping FMs. The present article delves into the network of relationships within FMs in the Italian city of Bologna. This study adopts the Social Network (...) Analysis (SNA) methodology applied with the Net-Map tool. The research objectives are to visualise the underlying network structure, map the dynamics, and identify the key actors who play pivotal roles in Bologna’s FMs and their level of influence. The research carried out interviews with ten FMs stakeholders, revealing the network of relationships between 54 actors, divided into three categories—civil society, food economy and public administration. Actors were linked by a total of 428 relationships across three types of networks: support, economic, and hindering. Findings indicate a strong support network structure characterised by varying degrees of centrality among different actors. Farmers emerge as a central node due to their pivotal role in providing fresh, local produce. Additionally, local institutions contribute significantly to FMs resilience and growth. Our research demonstrates the importance of recognising the embeddedness of FMs within the local context. By understanding the network structure and influential actors in FMs, policymakers can devise more effective policies for promoting local agriculture, and enhancing the sustainability of urban–rural exchanges. In conclusion, the present study offers valuable insights into the network dynamics of FMs, highlighting their crucial role in the sustainable development of urban and local food systems. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the role of some peculiar elements of Aristotle's dialectical development —namely, those emerging in the Sophistical Refutations (SE)— in the analysis and discussion of the Eleatic thesis in Physics I, 2-3. The paper adresses some of Aristotle's preliminary thoughts (Phys. I, 2) (which are read as methodological considerations), and some remarks against Melissus' argument (Phys. I, 3), in order to find connections between such claims and passages of SE, as well as the (...) Topics. -/- . (shrink)

On reviewing the literature regarding acceptance and trust in human-robot interaction (HRI), there are a number of open questions that needed to be addressed in order to establish effective collaborations between humans and robots in real-world applications. In particular, we identified four principal open areas that should be investigated to create guidelines for the successful deployment of robots in the wild. These areas are focused on: (1) the robot’s abilities and limitations; in particular when it makes errors with different severity (...) of consequences, (2) individual differences, (3) the dynamics of human-robot trust, and (4) the interaction between humans and robots over time. In this paper, we present two very similar studies, one with a virtual robot with human-like abilities, and one with a Care-O-bot 4 robot. In the first study, we create an immersive narrative using an interactive storyboard to collect responses of 154 participants. In the second study, 6 participants had repeated interactions over three weeks with a physical robot. We summarise and discuss the findings of our investigations of the effects of robots’ errors on people’s trust in robots for designing mechanisms that allow robots to recover from a breach of trust. In particular, we observed that robots’ errors had greater impact on people’s trust in the robot when the errors were made at the beginning of the interaction and had severe consequences. Our results also provided insights on how these errors vary according to the individuals’ personalities, expectations and previous experiences. (shrink)

This article interprets Foucault’s intellectual project by analysing the relation between his understanding of critique and the political conditions of subjectivation out of which it emerged. After reviewing some of the most typical criticisms of Foucault’s work, the argument shows in what sense he conceived of critique as a form of resistance and how the latter, in turn, was theorised as a force co-extensive to the power it counters. The paper goes on to argue that his theory of resistance is (...) not necessarily to be viewed as a metaphysical representation of the immutable nature of political struggle, but might well be interpreted in performative terms, i.e. as a strategic re-inscription of existing political-discursive formations. More precisely, the analysis shows in what way Foucault’s articulation of critique represented an attempt to displace the forms of subjectivation that underpin anthropological thought and the government of the self in the modern age. (shrink)

Academic self-efficacy beliefs influence students’ academic and career choices, as well as motivational factors and learning strategies promoting effective academic success. Nevertheless, few studies have focused on the academic self-efficacy of university students in comparison to students at other levels. Furthermore, extant measures present several limitations. The first aim of this study was to develop a reliable and valid scale assessing university students’ self-efficacy beliefs in managing academic tasks. The second aim was to investigate differences in academic self-efficacy due to (...) gender, years of enrollment, and student status. The study involved 831 students enrolled in undergraduate programs. Indicators of academic experiences and performance were collected. A new scale measuring students’ academic self-efficacy beliefs was administered. Results from a preliminary Exploratory Factor Analysis were consistently supported by findings from a Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Multigroup CFA supported the presence of measurement invariance. Analyses revealed that the new scale has eight factors: “Planning Academic Activities,” “Learning Strategies,” “Information Retrieval,” “Working in Groups,” “Management of Relationships with Teachers,” “Managing Lessons,” “Stress Management,” and “Thesis Work.” Self-efficacy dimensions showed significant relations with academic experiences and students’ performance indicators, as well as differences due to gender, years of enrollment, and student status. Findings are discussed in terms of practical implications for the implementation of intervention programs aimed at fostering self-efficacy beliefs and academic success. (shrink)

Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue (...) that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined. (shrink)

If Andrea knows that Biden won the last presidential election, then they also know that either Biden won the last presidential election, or Biden is a reptilian. This is the response that epistemic logics based on standard Kripke relational semantics provide, which is consistent with the fact that minimally rational agents can perform disjunction introduction. This is not the case in topic-sensitive semantics though. An agent might not grasp the concept of what a reptilian is, and therefore not be able (...) to know any proposition dealing with reptilians. By employing the concept of logical grounding, I propose a semantics that keeps the requirement of topic-grasping but weakens it, re-establishing a more standard treatment of disjunction, in line with the capacities of minimally rational agents. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I introduce topic-sensitive semantics. In Section 3 I introduce the concept of logical grounding – focusing on the grounds of disjunction – and motivate some desiderata. The concept of minimal topic, the core of my proposal, is detailed in Section 4 and exploited in Section 5 to propose a new topic-sensitive semantic clause for knowledge. I conclude in Section 6. (shrink)

En el artículo se examinan los dos intentos de Aristóteles por explicar el fenómeno de las acciones voluntarias e involuntarias: Ética Eudemia (EE) II 6-9 y Ética Nicomaquea (EN) III 1. Entre ambos tratamientos hay muchas coincidencias, pero también diferencias sustantivas, tanto en la caracterización de las acciones involuntarias como en la estrategia argumentativa general y la definición de lo voluntario. El artículo procura dar cuenta de dichas diferencias de contenido en función de la estrategia metodológica general por la que (...) opta Aristóteles en uno y otro caso. The article examines Aristotle's two attempts to explain the phenomena of voluntary and involuntary actions: Eudemian Ethics (EE) II 6-9 and Nicomachean Ethics (EN) III 1. Though there are notorious coincidences, there are also substantial differences between them in the characterization of involuntary actions, in the general argumentative strategy, and in the definition of voluntary actions. The paper endeavors to account for these material differences on the basis of the general methodological strategy used by Aristotle in each case. (shrink)

Introduction to the monographic section on contemporary analytic metaphysics.

This article is about the methodological remarks in Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145b2–7, and the way they are carried out in the following chapters. I argue that the procedure therein described does not aim to establish consistency among a subset of endoxa, but to test and refine—by considering and resolving objections against them—endoxa that could enter into a nominal definition of continence and incontinence. The dialectical lineage of this discussion, if there is one, is to be found in the use of (...) the critical procedure of resolution that can be traced back to Topics and Sophistical Refutations. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance (and of accidental causes), meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s concept of accidental cause and to (...) chance, is best understood as a second-order predicate. More precisely, Aristotle uses ‘indeterminate’ to qualify a certain type of causal relation, rather than to indicate a quality of the causal power or of the effect. As a preparatory step in my argument, I contend that ‘accidental’ and ‘per se’ are also best understood as second-order predicates of ‘cause,’ and as a corollary of my main thesis I offer an interpretation of how chance involves an infinite number of possible causes. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance, meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s concept of accidental cause and to chance, is best understood (...) as a second-order predicate. More precisely, Aristotle uses ‘indeterminate’ to qualify a certain type of causal relation, rather than to indicate a quality of the causal power or of the effect. As a preparatory step in my argument, I contend that ‘accidental’ and ‘per se’ are also best understood as second-order predicates of ‘cause,’ and as a corollary of my main thesis I offer an interpretation of how chance involves an infinite number of possible causes. (shrink)